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1 Introduction
Over the past 15 months the economy of the euro zone and its individual member
economies have had the first experience of operating in a completely new environment.
This is very much a learning process as the regime change that EMU involves renders
obsolete some of the key economic relationships that would normally help Central
Bankers and governments tune their instruments of economic management. It will be
some time before we fully understand the factors driving the demand for money within
the new Union and the process whereby the euro zone rate of inflation is determined is
undergoing substantial change. All this makes it difficult for policy makers in the ECB
and in individual member states to do their job.
This paper first considers the dilemma facing the ECB itself in managing the euro zone
economy. It then turns to the issues facing individual governments in managing their own
"regional" economies within the euro zone - in particular the issues facing the Irish
government.
The reasons for small economies joining the EMU may well be different from those for
larger economies. In particular the reduction in the risk premia attaching to smaller
currencies, such as the Irish pound, means that such economies will experience lower
interest rates in the medium term and, therefore, higher levels of investment than would
be possible outside the Union. However, part of the price of this more favourable interest
rate environment in the medium term is a reduction in the ability of individual member
states to control their own economies in the face of a "one size fits all" monetary policy.
In considering the problems faced by governments of individual member states in the
euro zone we first consider the extent to which they should be concerned about deviations
in domestic inflation rates from the average euro zone rate. We identify significant
benefits to EMU membership but also a cost in the reduction in the ability to control
pressures on domestic property markets.
However, while the Irish government has a reduced range of economic instruments under
EMU, it still has considerable scope to manage its own economy. Fiscal policy, while
less effective an instrument than monetary policy for directly influencing inflationary
pressures in asset markets, remains an effective instrument for moderating domestic
demand pressures. It could be used both to control excess demand in the economy as a
whole, and also to reduce dangerous pressures on the domestic property market. In the
long run, the key elements of supply side policy, that can really make a permanent
difference to growth and living standards, are unaffected by EMU. The National
Development Plan will probably prove much more important to the future of the
economy than will any individual budget or any decision made by the ECB.
Within EMU the parameters of domestic policy action are reduced, but not eliminated.
However, this changed environment requires alterations in the way governments manage
their economies, with more attention being placed on the regional impact of fiscal policy.
2Member governments have frequently stressed the need for the private sector to adjust to
the regime change that EMU membership involves. There is also a need for the
governments themselves to recognise this change in formulating their own policies.
Finally, this paper does not consider the problems facing regions of national economies
that have very little fiscal autonomy. With the exception of the Northern Ireland
Economic Council’s study (Bradley, 1998), this issue has to date received little attention
in the literature.
Managing the Euro Today
The US economy has experienced an exceptional period of sustained growth over the last
decade. Whether or not the impact of new technology helps explain this success, what is
clear is that this can not be sustained at its current rate. American households are
continuing to fund the remarkable growth in consumption through ever increasing
household indebtedness and the US economy as a whole is also moving ever further into
debt, as reflected in the growing balance of payments deficit. The strength of the dollar
means that US goods and services are now more expensive relative to European goods
than they have been at any time over the last 20 years.
The momentum of growth in US consumption has exceeded the ability of the US
economy to produce and, sooner or later, it must slow. Whether this slow-down occurs
gradually, because more and more American households are afraid to borrow any more,
or whether it occurs more rapidly as the rest of the world - the lenders - take fright,
remains to be seen. Either way the overvaluation of the US dollar relative to the euro will
eventually be reversed. The only question is when?
While the US is essentially a very closed economy, with import prices having a limited
impact on domestic inflation, the continuing rise in the value of the dollar has exerted
some downward pressure on US inflation, offsetting the effects of a tight domestic labour
market. If and when the dollar reverses direction, there will be an additional external
impulse to US inflation on top of domestic inflationary pressures. This could prove
unfortunate, necessitating a further rise in interest rates at a time when the economy was
already slowing.
The moral of the story is that US monetary policy has been too lax for some time -
possibly for political reasons in the run up to the US presidential election. Demand in the
US has grown more rapidly than supply and the resulting overvaluation of the dollar (and
of the US stockmarket) holds the seeds of a possible sudden and destabilising reversal of
fortunes.
The uncertainty about the future of the US economy poses a problem, not just for the
governor of the Fed, Mr. Greenspan, but also for the ECB and Mr. Duisenberg. The EU
economy is at last beginning to pick itself up off the floor with relatively rapid growth in
both the German and the French economies last year and this year. Relaxed monetary
policy has helped promote such a recovery. However, with the weakness of the euro there
has been some increase in inflationary pressures within the euro zone, driven by rising
3input costs. Goods priced in dollars inevitably cost more and the dollar price of oil, in
particular, has risen.
To keep EU inflation this year below 2 per cent interest rates should probably be higher
than they are now. However, the dilemma for Mr. Duisenberg and the ECB is that they
know that at some stage in the next few years the positions of the euro and the dollar will
be reversed, with the dollar falling significantly in value vis à vis the euro. If that were to
happen within the next two years, the EU economy would find itself facing a much less
competitive environment and one with much reduced inflationary pressure.
If the ECB were to substantially tighten monetary policy at this point it could well induce
such a reversal in the relative value of the dollar and the euro, slowing the nascent euro
zone recovery. This in turn would render the stance of EU monetary policy too tight.
The underlying problem facing central banks on either side of the Atlantic is the
likelihood that, when the time comes for economic fundamentals to reassert their
influence on exchange rates, the resulting change in exchange rates will not be smooth.
Very rapid changes can occur over a short period of time. This was the experience in the
1980s when the DM fell against the dollar by 40 per cent between mid 1980 and mid
1981 and, when the time came to reverse the process in 1985, the dollar in turn fell by
nearly 30 per cent against the DM over the course of the following year. This
demonstrates that a monetary policy stance that is appropriate to the short-term needs of
an economy before such a change, will almost inevitably be seen to be inappropriate
immediately after the change.
This is why the objective of controlling inflation in the EU has to be set in a medium-
term context – and temporary deviations in the rate of inflation from its long-term trend
may have to be accepted. Under these circumstances it is appropriate for the ECB to
follow the current approach of tightening monetary policy gradually, focusing on the
future when the value of the euro will move back into line with the value that economic
fundamentals would dictate. To focus on short term currency gyrations, induced by the
lemming-like behaviour of the financial markets, could destabilise the real economy of
the euro zone, and ultimately be very counterproductive.
In so far as mistakes are currently being made in monetary policy, they are occurring on
the other side of the Atlantic. Once the US elections are over it will then be more than
time for the Fed to begin the process of winding the US economy down from its current
frenzied state. However, it will be a dangerous process for the US economy and, because
of its significance for the world as a whole, and for Ireland in particular, the rest of us
could find the ride uncomfortable.
The Benefits and Cost of Membership - Risk Premia
Membership of the Economic and Monetary Union since its inception in January last year
has undoubtedly led to some restriction on the scope for independent policy action in
Ireland. This loss of an important policy instrument must be considered in the light of the
potential benefits that are expected to arise from membership. Much of the discussion in
4Ireland and elsewhere of the costs and benefits of EMU membership has focused on
essentially short-term gains or losses. However, the decision on membership involved a
permanent commitment to a new policy regime and it was only appropriate that the
benefits and costs be assessed on a long-term basis - what would be the effects on the
economy over at least a ten or fifteen year time horizon.
One of the key long-term reasons why membership of EMU was considered desirable for
Ireland was the expected long-term impact on interest rates and the cost of capital. When
the decision on membership was made there was extensive evidence from 15 years of
monetary independence that that independence was bought at the cost of much higher
interest rates (Honohan, 1993). Figure 1 shows the cumulative "excess returns" from
lending in Irish pounds compared to DMs over the period 1979-99. As shown in Figure 1,
the relative cost of borrowing in Irish pounds compared to borrowing in DMs carried a
substantial excess over the full 20 year period of monetary independence. Even allowing
for exchange rate changes, the higher Irish pound interest rates over the 20 years would
have resulted in a cumulative 50 per cent higher return on Irish pound lending than DM
lending. This amounts to an excess return of 2 percentage points a year.
Figure 1: Cumulative Excess Returns
The fact that the cost of capital was so much higher in Ireland than in Germany over all
of that period had a serious negative effect on the level of investment and, as a result, on
the potential growth rate of the economy. Investment by the private sector across a wide
range of assets was substantially reduced and, especially in the 1980s when the public
finances were in disarray, the higher interest rates led to underinvestment in public
infrastructure.
In the light of the crisis in the public finances in the 1980s and the poor performance of
the economy generally it was not surprising that the financial markets exacted a
substantial price for lending in Irish pounds. The cumulative excess returns between 1979
and 1988 were 34 per cent or just under 3 percentage points a year. However, over the
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5course of the 1990s the Irish economy performed much better and the public finances
strengthened continually over the period, yet the cumulative excess returns between the
beginning of 1989 and the end of 1998 were 14 per cent, and the average annual excess
return was 1.4 percentage points.
How can this excess be explained? In the 1980s the explanation seems obvious - a
significant risk premium attached to the Irish economy because of poor domestic
management, a crisis in the public finances, and the potential for a serious collapse due to
the ballooning national debt. However, none of these arguments applied to the 1990s
when the economy was well managed and the debt has fallen dramatically.
It would seem that there are other factors at work. It is instructive that under EMU, where
no exchange risk applies, the margin attaching to Irish government borrowing (and that of
some other smaller economies) compared to German borrowing is around 0.25
percentage points.1 It may well be the case that, for a small currency, the price of
information to the financial markets is quite high. In the past, if a financial institution
wished to invest in Irish pound assets they would have to study the prospects for the Irish
pound as well as the prospects for the Irish public finances. In the 1990s, with many other
similar government bond offerings from larger economies, the cost of studying the Irish
economy may not have been warranted.
In the light of this evidence, the 1996 study of the prospects for Ireland in EMU (Baker et
al., 1996) took the view that the excess returns in the long run would fall to one
percentage point if Ireland were to remain outside EMU. The cost of such a permanent
wedge in the cost of capital was considered to be quite high. It would have resulted in the
economy underperfoming on a long-term basis as investment was kept below its
potential.
It is interesting to examine the situation elsewhere in this regard. The Swedish
government report (Calmfors, 1997) on EMU entry, that paralleled the Irish one, also
considered this issue. They too found that in the past there had been a significant risk
premium attaching to Swedish kroner assets. However, in their case they felt that, with
rational markets, the premium would eventually disappear.
Finally, it is interesting to consider the position of the UK, a large economy with a
currency that is studied by all major financial institutions. Figure 1 also shows the excess
returns on sterling assets compared to DM assets over the same 20 year period as for the
Irish data. While the pattern is much more bumpy compared to the steady rise in the Irish
series, by the end of 1998 the excess returns on sterling assets were almost identical to
those on Irish pound assets. Over the period 1979 to 1998 the excess returns on sterling
assets was also 2.1 percentage points a year.
Whether or not this had a significant impact on the UK economy's performance over the
past 20 years depends on how sensitive it was to changes in the cost of capital. Certainly
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6the much lower level of public debt than in the case of Ireland would suggest a lower
sensitivity. Also the excess returns were highest in the 1980s, falling to just under one per
cent a year between 1989 and 1998.
Looking to the future, one would expect that the cost of information about the UK
economy would be lower than for smaller economies. As a result, the future premium that
the financial markets will require to lend in sterling will probably be lower than for
smaller, less well-known economies, such as Sweden or Denmark. However, on the basis
of the evidence of the 1990s, it would seem that some risk premium will continue to be
charged in the future on sterling assets. This will represent part of the cost to the UK of
remaining out of EMU, a cost that must be offset against the other benefits that enhanced
policy independence is likely to confer.
The major potential cost for the Irish economy from EMU membership arises from the
increased policy inflexibility, due to the loss of an important instrument - monetary
policy. In the 1996 report, a number of scenarios were considered to see how the
economy would react to shocks both in and out of EMU. Among the shocks considered
were a sudden loss of competitiveness against sterling as well as a major rise in the value
of sterling.
What these simulations showed was that there were likely to be significant costs arising
from the loss of flexibility consequent on EMU membership. In particular, in 1996 a
sudden major loss of competitiveness against sterling would have imposed substantial
temporary costs on the economy.
The approach adopted in Baker et al., 1996, involved firstly deriving an estimate of the
potential cost of shocks. This was done by simulating the external effects of the shock
using the National Institute for Economic and Social Research’s NiGEM model and the
domestic effects were then examined using the ESRI’s HERMES model. This analysis
used the example of a sterling shock to estimate the cost of shocks under varying
exchange rate regimes – Ireland in and out of EMU.
Table 1: Medium-Term Effects of Irish Membership of EMU
Average change in level compared to benchmark
UK  Out UK  In
Effects of: Change in GNP, %
Transactions costs 0.1 0.1
Interest Rates 1.7 1.7
Competitiveness - steady state -0.4 0.0
Cumulative Effect - Tranquil Scenario 1.4 1.8
Risk of Shocks - Competitiveness etc. -1.0 -0.4
Net Effect 0.4 1.4
Change in Employment, (000)
Net Effect 10,000 20,000
Having arrived at an estimate of the cost of shocks the second task was to derive a weight
to attach to the calculated cost. This weight should reflect the expected frequency and
intensity of future shocks. The past experience of the sterling - DM exchange rate was
used as an indicator of the frequency and intensity of future shocks. If either changes in
7UK policy or the creation of the EMU itself were to reduce the volatility of the future
euro-sterling rate this could reduce the cost of shocks below what was estimated. Finally,
account was taken of the fact that a reasonable exchange rate policy outside EMU would
not eliminate all of the shocks. (Indeed, the exchange rate policy assumed in the
simulations would have eliminated less than a half of the effects of these shocks.)
Using this information in an appropriate model, the report arrived at an overall
assessment of the allowance which should be made for the possible cost of future shocks
under different exchange rate regimes. It can be seen as the insurance premium which it
would be worth paying to buy protection against future shocks.
The result of applying this methodology suggested that the allowance for the avoidable
cost of shocks need be no higher than the annual equivalent of 1 per cent of GNP. This is
insufficient to offset the estimated steady gains of around 1.4 per cent of GNP, largely
arising from the lower risk premium on interest rates in the long run(Table 1). Having
made provision for the cost of possible shocks, the net benefit of EMU membership in
terms of employment was estimated to be of the order of 10,000.
These quantified macroeconomic benefits of lower interest rates and risks of adverse
currency movements were both rather smaller than might have been expected.
The report also identified a number of other potential but unquantifiable effects of joining
EMU, some of which could be substantial. They include the impact of commitment to
Europe and increased currency stability on business confidence and investment plans
among Irish and overseas investors. They also include wider political factors which are
inherently unquantifiable. These unquantified effects seem likely to enhance the
probability that EMU membership will prove beneficial.
On balance, for Ireland, the quantified effects in the 1996 report indicated that EMU
membership is likely to provide a modest benefit in terms of output, employment, and
trade. When the unquantified effects are included the benefits from membership are
likely to prove more significant. If the UK were to join the EMU then the gain from
membership for Ireland would be further enhanced. However, even then, the probable net
benefits would still be on a smaller scale than the net gains from the completion of the
Single European Market (SEM) in 1992 or from the inflow of European Structural Funds
over the past decade.
Regime Change Affects Members and Non-Members
It was clear at the outset that EMU would affect the behaviour of the economies of all the
members in a wide range of different ways. However, what was possibly less obvious,
was that even for non-members within the EU, EMU would also represent a regime shift.
For the Irish economy it is of particular interest how the UK reacts to the changed
environment.
The Irish retail sector is dominated by UK firms and quite a high proportion of goods
sold in Irish shops are sourced in the UK. Studies of the Irish rate of inflation in the past
8have indicated that inflation was driven by changes in consumer prices in the UK and
changes in the bilateral exchange rate (Fitz Gerald and Shortall, 1998). Generally,
changes in the exchange rate take some time to feed through to Irish prices. In addition, if
sterling moved unilaterally against all other currencies the rate of pass-through would be
greatly attentuated.
Figure 2 considers the forecasting power of such a model using data available up to early
1998 (Fitz Gerald and Shortall, 1998). It contrasts the forecasts produced by the model
from 1998Q1 to 1999Q4 with those produced by a simple PPP model between Ireland
and Britain which takes no account of the position of the UK price level relative to its
equilibrium level.2
As one would expect, the significant appreciation in sterling in 1997-98 fed through fully
into the simple PPP model, an inflation rate of almost 8 per cent being predicted by the
end of 1998. The adjusted PPP model, which allows for the fact that the UK exchange
rate in 1998 was not expected to persist, produced forecasts which were much lower. It
took account of the UK’s position compared to its equilibrium price level.
Figure 2: Forecasts of Irish Constant Tax Price Inflation
Both, however, gave significantly higher predictions for 1998 than was actually the case.
The Irish pound fell against both sterling and the Deutschmark during this period, so
much of the change in the exchange rate wasn’t counteracted by an increased deviation of
UK prices from trend, resulting in a prediction of accelerating inflation. This over-
prediction provides early evidence that a regime change is under way as more and more
British firms begin to price in euros. McArdle, 2000, provides additional supporting
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9evidence, indicating that UK firms are increasingly pricing in euros rather than in sterling
so that they carry the cost of unexpected exchange rate changes.
What appears to have happened is that UK firms, fearing increased competition on the
broader euro-zone market, including Ireland, moved to setting prices in euros. As a result,
they tended to hold their prices relatively unchanged in Irish pound terms, fearing a loss
of market share if they did not. Effectively the UK suppliers on the Irish market are
behaving as price takers. The UK manufacturer or supplier, therefore, largely carries the
cost of this failure to adjust prices in the form of reduced profit margins.  Hall, Walsh and
Yates, 1997, using data from a Bank of England survey carried out in 1995, found that
market levels are of primary importance in price determination for UK companies.
Furthermore, the survey found that companies typically reviewed prices at regular time
intervals, rather than responding to particular events.
The inflation outturn in Ireland in 1998 and 1999 was different from what would have
been suggested by models of inflation based on past behaviour. Under the previous model
of inflation, while the pass through of an appreciation of sterling would have been slow,
some of the appreciation would eventually have shown through in Irish prices. This
certainly had not happened up to mid-1999. The evidence from the last two years would,
thus, suggest a change in behaviour by UK firms moving them, if not the UK economy as
a whole, into the euro-zone.
An example, of this strategic behaviour by firms in the face of exchange rate uncertainty
was the response by an Irish firm, the Irish Distillers Group in 1987, faced with rapidly
changing exchange rates. They responded to a query from the Restrictive Practices
Commission explaining differences in the net of tax prices for their product North and
South of the border:
“The company’s N.I. price list was fixed in 1986 on a projected value of the Irish
pound to sterling of 85p and this value should be used to give a true indication of
the difference.”3
The fact that their expectations about the exchange rate were not realised immediately did
not cause them to change their prices. Their forecast for the exchange rate, while wrong
for the period in question, proved reasonably accurate for 1988 and 1989. What this
shows is that exchange rate expectations are at least as important in determining
economic behaviour as is the actual current exchange rate.
For Irish exporters on the UK market there is some evidence that they have seen an
improvement in profit margin as they failed to fully cut the sterling price of their goods as
sterling strengthened. However, the evidence from the wholesale price index and the
deflator for exports in 1998 and 1999 suggests that the extent of profit-taking has been
                                                
3 Restrictive Practices Commission, 1987
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relatively low.4 The latest data for end 1999 does suggest a pick up in such prices, but
much of this may be accounted for by other factors, such as the rise in oil prices.
Ireland's Exposure to Sterling
We consider here a range of indicators of how the structure of the Irish economy has
changed in recent years. The general import of these indicators is that the economy has
become steadily less dependent on the UK, with the pace of change, if anything,
increasing in recent years.
Figure 3: Share of Irish Trade with the UK, 1960-1998
Percentage of Total Trade
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 Figure 4: Share of Irish Trade with the EU excluding the UK, 1972-1998
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effectively priced in dollars. In this case it is the strength of the dollar rather than the strength of sterling
that is important.
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Exposure to a sterling shock depends on the structure of the Irish economy and the
behaviour of the economic agents that operate within the economy. Historically the UK
has been a very important economic neighbour in terms of trade and, indeed, in terms of
the labour market. Figure 3 shows that the UK's share of Irish imports and exports has
declined steadily since 1960. Having averaged 71 per cent between 1960 and 1969,
export dependency had fallen to 22.6 per cent by 1998. The decline in import dependency
is less dramatic. From an annual average of 51 per cent during the 1960s, import
dependency had fallen to 34 per cent by 1998.
Declining dependency on the UK means increasing dependency on other economies as a
market for exports and a source of imports. Figures 4 and 5 show the share of Irish trade
with the EU (excluding the UK) and the share with the US and Canada. For the EU
(excluding the UK) there has been a marked difference in the performance of exports and
imports. The EU market has become increasingly important as a destination for Irish
exports. Having accounted for 21.3 per cent of exports in 1973, it accounted for 45.7 per
cent of Irish exports in 1998. In contrast, continental Europe has remained broadly static
as a source of Irish imports.
Figure 5: Share of Irish Trade with US and Canada, 1975-1998
Percentage of Total Trade
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Analysis of the share of Irish trade with the US and Canada since 1975 (Figure 5) points
to an increasing export and import dependence. Exports and imports with this region
were low in 1975 at 7.4 per cent and 8.2 per cent respectively. In both cases the increase
in share has been substantial. In the case of export this increased to 14.1 per cent by 1998,
while the import share increased to 17 per cent over the same time period.
The report on the Economic Implications for Ireland of EMU (Baker et al., 1996)
examined the exposure of manufacturing to a sterling shock. The study considered both
the currency exposure of individual sectors and their sensitivity to sudden interest rate
changes. Based on data to 1993, this analysis found that the sectors which were most
exposed to a potential currency risk were those with a considerable proportion of their
output sold in the UK market and with a domestic market which was subject to extensive
12
UK competition. The fast-growing export-oriented sectors appeared to be relatively
insensitive to the level of Irish interest rates and little affected by sterling exposure. Of
the 40 industrial sectors considered, one sector, clothing, was highly exposed to
variations in the sterling exchange rate and another three (two processed food sectors and
textiles) were fairly highly exposed. A further 11 industrial sectors were assessed as
moderately exposed to sterling fluctuations. The remaining 25 sectors appear to have had
a sterling exposure ranging from fairly low to low, because they either served mainly
non-UK export markets, or had a large and reasonably protected domestic market.
Figure 6: Currency exposure
percentage of manufacturing employment
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Employment figures for the different sectors identified in the EMU study have been
calculated for the period 1980 to 1999 to determine the exposure of the manufacturing
sector has changed.5 In terms of currency exposure there has been a decline in
employment in sectors that were assessed as having a high or fairly high currency risk. In
1992 these sectors, clothing, meats, sugar and cocoa confectionery and other textiles,
accounted for around 25,500 jobs, or 13.3 per cent of total manufacturing employment.
By 1999 this had declined to just over 22,000, or 9.5 per cent of employment in
manufacturing. This suggests that, while overall employment levels within these sectors
have not declined markedly, growth in manufacturing employment has reduced the
importance of these sectors, as shown in Figure 6. It is also worth noting that the sectors
that had a low or very low currency exposure have increased in importance with numbers
employed increasing from 73,450 in 1992 (38.2 per cent of manufacturing employment)
to 105,050 in 1999 (45.1 per cent of those employed in manufacturing).
Similar analysis in the EMU report of the sensitivity to changes in Irish interest rates
suggested that 8 industrial sectors had high or fairly high sensitivity to interest rates
changes. These sectors included clothing and various other industries dependent on the
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than the Census of Industrial Production, which provides greater detail.
13
domestic market. A large group of 16 industrial sectors were assessed as moderately
sensitive to interest rates. The remaining sectors appear to have had relatively low interest
rate sensitivity. As is shown in Figure 7 there has been a marginal decline in the sectors
having high interest rate sensitivity, namely minerals, and building materials. In 1992
these sectors accounted for 5.4 per cent of manufacturing employment, or 10,650. By
1999 employment in the sector had risen to 11,250. However, growth in total
employment has resulted in the sector accounting for 4.7 per cent of manufacturing
employment. For the sectors considered with a “fairly high” interest rate exposure,
employment in absolute levels increased slightly from 36,725 in 1992 to 37,200 in 1999.
However, the proportion of total employment in these sectors also fell from 18.6 per cent
to 15.5 per cent. As is evident from the Figure, since 1992 there has been a sharp increase
in the proportion of employment with a “very low” interest rate exposure. These sectors
are for the most part the high-technology firms and include recorded media, high-margin
chemicals, office machinery and computers, and high-margin food. Employment in these
sectors increased from 22,425 in 1992, or 11.4 per cent, to 36,650 or 15.2 per cent of
employment in 1999.
Figure 7: Interest Rate Sensitivity
percentage of manufacturing employment
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This analysis of employment trends since the 1996 report was published, suggests that the
proportion of manufacturing employment in sectors particularly exposed to sterling
fluctuations (or relatively sensitive to Irish interest rate movements) has declined
substantially.
Over the last ten years the ESRI HERMES model of the Irish economy has been used
extensively for policy simulation and forecasting. Since it was first estimated, with data
for the period 1974 to 1987, it has been re-estimated every two or three years. Each time
more recent data have been included, the sensitivity of the manufacturing sector to
changes in labour cost competitiveness is seen to have fallen. On the other hand, the
sensitivity to interest rates has risen over time. Given the decline in the proportion of
employment in manufacturing in sectors particularly exposed to interest rate fluctuations,
this change in the model implies some more generalised increased interest rate
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sensitivity, both in manufacturing sectors not previously considered very exposed, and
also elsewhere in the economy. With the big increase in the share of resources now
devoted to investment, especially in housing, this change in exposure demonstrated in the
model is not very surprising.
This change in model behaviour reflects the changing structure of the economy as many
firms in the tradable sector that were vulnerable to competition from low cost countries
have gone under, and been replaced by new high technology firms. As identified above,
this is reflected in the decline in the number of manufacturing firms vulnerable on labour
cost grounds to a sterling shock. It also underlies the changing structure of Irish trade.
Potential Effects of Shocks
The potential impact of a major change in the bilateral sterling-euro (Irish pound) rate
depends to a major extent on where the two economies are beginning from - is sterling
overvalued or undervalued. It also depends on whether the change in the exchange rate is
perceived to be permanent or temporary.
For example, if sterling and the Irish pound were initially at levels that were consistent
with the underlying economic structures of the two economies, and if, as a result, prices
and wages had also fully adjusted to that rate, then any new change in the rate that was
perceived to be permanent would have an economic effect. It would result in a change in
prices and wages in the two economies and it would also affect the long-term relative
competitiveness of the two economies. In turn, the perceived change in profitability could
affect investment flows.
However, if sterling was beginning from a position where it was considered very
“overvalued” in terms of the euro, and if everyone had assumed that this overvaluation
was temporary, then prices and wages might not have adjusted to this “temporary”
overvalued exchange rate. Firms would continue to supply each other’s markets
anticipating that future exchange rate changes would restore the profitability of such sales
to a “normal ” level. In this latter case, a reversion of sterling towards what might be
considered its “equilibrium” rate might have little effect. Prices, not having changed in
response to the overvaluation, would not change in the face of a depreciation. Firms
would also not change their output and sales as there was no change in their expected
long-term profitability.
The evidence suggests that today sterling is grossly overvalued from the point of view of
economic fundamentals - estimates range from 15 per cent to 25 per cent. Prices within
the UK, expressed in a common currency, are out of line with those in Ireland or
elsewhere in the euro zone. Instead of the UK price level falling to bring UK prices (and
wages) back into line with their normal relationship vis a vis competitor countries, firms
are waiting for the exchange rate itself to undertake the adjustment. However, as
discussed earlier, in their trade with the outside world there are signs that UK
manufacturers are behaving differently from the past.
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The effect of the high valuation of sterling over the last two years has been to squeeze
profitability of UK firms and, to some extent, to enhance the profitability of Irish firms
exporting to the UK over the period. What is difficult to assess is the extent to which this
change in profitability, that firms themselves may regard as temporary, has affected
investment. If the high valuation of sterling had been regarded as permanent then one
would have expected to see a shift in investment, with firms closing in the UK and firms
opening in Ireland just because of the exchange rate change. However, while the
economy in Ireland has been very successful over the period, it seems unlikely that much
of the investment in the business sector has been driven by the current sterling value. The
cost of making an investment, and the time-lags inherent in any major investment
decision, means that it must be a “forward looking” choice by firms. It is their
expectations about future profitability a number of years ahead that determines the
choices made by firms. It is only where firms have spare capacity North and South of the
border, as in the case of some food processing plants, that output can rapidly be shifted to
take advantage of temporary changes in exchange rates. However, this must be seen as
the exception rather than the rule.
On the basis of the above analysis, the effects of a sudden large depreciation in sterling
can be classified into three different scenarios. The likely impacts of these different
scenarios were examined using the NiGEM world model and the HERMES model of the
Irish economy.
1. In the first case it is assumed that firms have not adjusted their prices to sterling’s
high value so that an unwinding of the current position would have no direct effects
on the rate of inflation in Ireland or the UK. We then consider how the loss of
competitiveness faced by Irish firms impacts on the economy. Because there is no
chance under this scenario of Irish firms’ costs adjusting downwards or of UK firms’
costs adjusting upwards, this produces the most adverse long-term impact on
competitiveness.
2. The second scenario we consider is where UK and Irish prices are assumed to have
adjusted to the high value of sterling. In this case, because prices and wages can
adjust in the long run, the long-term loss of competitiveness is small, though the
short-term loss is similar to that in the first scenario.
3. The final “extreme” assumption is that firms in the UK and Ireland have continued to
make key decisions based on their expectations concerning the long-term bilateral
exchange rate, which is very different from the current rate. As a result, under this
scenario, a movement of sterling that validates these expectations could be expected
to have little or no economic effect.
The research evidence discussed above is not sufficiently conclusive to allow us to say
exactly where the Irish and UK economies lie within the boundaries delineated by these
three Scenarios. What does seem clear is that sterling is overvalued (or the euro
undervalued). Price and wage levels in Ireland and the UK have not fully adjusted to the
current situation. However, firms, while generally discounting the current strength of
sterling, have probably built its strength into some decisions on output (e.g. vulnerable
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firms staying in business) or investment. Scenario 2, where prices and wages are assumed
to have fully adjusted in both Ireland and the UK to the current exchange rate, is not
consistent with the evidence on price levels. As a result, the most probable outcome lies
somewhere between scenarios 1 and 3.
Table 2: Effects of Different Shocks on the Exchequer
GNP Debt/GNP Ratio as percentage of GNP
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 US Equity
Shock
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 US Equity
Shock
Year 1 -1.2 -2.5 0 -3.0 0.3 0.6 0 3.4
Year 2 -1.9 -1.8 0 -3.5 1.2 0.7 0 5.3
Year 5 -2.0 +1.4 0 0.6 3.2 -2.3 0 3.8
Table 2 shows the cumulative impact of a series of shocks on the level of GNP and on the
debt/GNP ratio after one, two and five years respectively. For comparative purposes we
have also included the possible impact of a US equity price shock, a scenario that is
described in detail in the Medium-Term Review: 1999-2005. The shock involving US
equity prices falling by 25 per cent was assumed to have a serious impact on foreign
direct investment into Ireland, triggering a collapse in Irish house prices. Such a shock
would have a much greater impact on the Irish economy than would any of the sterling
shock scenarios considered here.
From the point of view of the public finances the worst case scenario for a sterling fall of
25 per cent is scenario 1. However, even with such a shock the likely maximum impact
on exchequer savings would be under one percentage point of GNP and the cumulative
increase in the debt / GNP ratio after five years would be 3.2 percentage points. As
discussed above, because the most probable outturn from a sudden sterling depreciation
would lie between Scenarios 1 and 3, this would suggest that the economy generally, and
the public finances in particular, are not very exposed to sterling shocks. However, if the
shock were sufficiently great to trigger a collapse in Irish house prices then these results
would be significantly magnified.
When the results of a sterling shock under different scenarios are compared with the
results from a shock to the US economy the latter would appear to be much more serious
from the point of view of the economy as a whole, and the exchequer in particular. This
suggests that the Irish economy is now more exposed to the US economy than to shocks
to sterling.
Movements in sterling have been correlated with movements in the dollar in recent years.
A particularly adverse set of circumstances would arise if there were a serious shock to
the US economy that also triggered a fall in sterling's value, along with that of the dollar.
Under these circumstances, the likely impact on the Irish economy would be greater than
that shown for a US equity price shock on its own. However, the additional adverse
effects coming through a weakening of sterling would be significantly smaller than those
generated directly by the shock to the US economy. This highlights the growth in
Ireland's exposure to shocks to the US economy, affecting the Irish economy both
directly and indirectly.
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This analysis would suggest that, when the likely realignment of sterling occurs, if it is
not accompanied by any other shocks, the effects on the Irish economy will be
unfavourable, but the magnitude of any adverse effects will be small.
Inflation in a Regional Economy in EMU - Ireland
The pick-up in the rate of inflation in consumer prices in Ireland in the last few months
has given rise to concerns about the future. In the context of monetary union, some of
these concerns are misplaced. However, when the broader developments in prices, in
particular in asset prices, are taken into account there are genuine worries that should
prompt a change in fiscal policy, the key instrument within monetary union for
controlling regional inflationary pressures.
In Ireland, since the mid-1970s, policy-makers have understood that the rate of inflation
of consumer goods is ultimately determined by external inflationary pressures and
changes in the exchange rate. Under these circumstances, within monetary union,
regional goods price inflation will tend to follow that of the union as a whole and the
monetary authorities will not pay too much attention to regional variations. You will not
hear of the US Federal Reserve worrying about the rate of inflation in Wyoming.
However, Ireland faces a more complex situation than many other members of the EMU
because of the very heavy weighting of UK firms in its retail sector, and because of the
importance of UK firms as suppliers of imports. As discussed earlier, the “inflationary
surprise” of the last two years was not the rise in consumer prices in the last three
months, but rather that the rate of consumer price inflation did not rise dramatically in
early 1998 when sterling’s value in Irish pound terms rose rapidly. The failure of
inflation in the price of consumer goods to respond at the time reflected a change in
behaviour of UK firms faced with the impending monetary union.
What we are seeing today in the acceleration in the rate of inflation in consumer prices is
a combination of a number of factors: a very big increase in oil prices, the increase in tax
on tobacco imposed in the December budget, and rapidly rising prices for private
services. It is the latter factor – inflation in the price of private services, that is of concern.
International competition has little direct impact on the price of sheltered services and
domestic wage inflation is passed fully through to consumers. There is no doubt that Irish
wage inflation is higher than in our EU neighbours, but that is not necessarily a cause for
immediate concern. The tightening labour market is driving this increase, and, as
discussed above, some loss of competitiveness is inevitable.
The concern about this trend is whether it will continue for a number of years, leading to
such a loss of competitiveness that unemployment eventually rises. The rise in the price
of domestic services will, in turn, feed back on wage rates and the competitiveness of the
tradable sector. Under monetary union such an overshoot in wage rates could only be
tackled through increased labour market flexibility through two possible channels: an
actual reduction in nominal wage rates or a wage freeze for a number of years. The
former would be both a painful and difficult process. In the case of the latter, while
nominal wages could remain static for a period, with inflation effecting a reduction in
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real rates, this could take some time in a low inflation environment. Slow adjustment
under such circumstances would have a high cost in terms of unnecessary unemployment.
The developments in inflation, including wage inflation, must be seen as part of a wider
convergence process. Irish goods prices were brought broadly into line with goods prices
elsewhere in the EU over the last 20 years. The completion of the internal market played
an important role in this process. Wage rates, and consequently services’ prices, faced
less pressure to converge. However, as Irish living standards move towards the EU
average, there will be a tendency for this to be reflected in the labour market and in
services’ prices. Even in the long term this process of price convergence will be much
weaker than in the case of goods’ prices, and policies to increase competition could
significantly improve the end result.
Thus, countries that are experiencing convergence in living standards are likely to face
higher inflation than countries that are already at the EU average. 6 However, this
difference in inflation rates should not necessarily cause concern as, when convergence is
attained, the process driving the accelerated inflation will disappear. It is only if the price
convergence is occurring so rapidly that an overshoot takes place that policy may need to
be changed.
Where there is real cause for concern today about the sustainability of the current growth
is in the inflation in asset prices − housing and other property. Its immediate impact is to
add to labour cost pressures. However, it also has wider implications with the potential to
cause real regional problems in any monetary union. This has happened in the past in the
US. Here we should be concerned because of the danger that the rise in property prices
could greatly overshoot its long-run equilibrium level and that there could be a sudden
“bust” brought on by an external shock.
For the bulk of the population who are well housed, the rise in the cost of accommodation
will not affect their standard of living. However, the households most adversely affected
by rising inflation are those seeking accommodation today. They face rapidly escalating
house prices and no feasible increase in incomes or tax cuts could compensate them for
their loss. Instead the solution must lie in the broadly canvassed supply side measures.
The costs of accommodation would appear to be higher in our cities than in those of most
of our European partners. In the long run the cost of building should be no greater in
Ireland than elsewhere – we have more abundant supplies of land than around
Amsterdam or Brussels. The problem is the absence of serviced sites and the labour
shortage that has arisen due to the exceptional growth rates faced by the industry. If the
problems of land availability are tackled urgently, over time, the industry and the labour
market will adjust, and the cost of new building should eventually be significantly lower
                                                
6 The Balassa-Samuleson effect - higher productivity in the economies converging from below will be
reflected in higher wage inflation. In turn, this will result in higher inflation in consumer prices in the
converging economy.
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than today. In the short term, the use of fiscal measures to take money out of the housing
market would ease inflationary pressures.
The likelihood that current prices for dwellings are probably well above their long-run
supply price, and that the inflation in prices is being driven by consumers’ expectations
about the future, means that any sudden shock to the economy and buyers’ expectations
could cause a serious, though temporary, recession. The fact that such an event seems far
away now is not a reason for ignoring it. The “safe stopping” or braking distance of the
economy can be quite long so that if the dangers posed by local asset price inflation are to
be controlled, fiscal policy, the only instrument available to the government, should
already have been tightened in the last few budgets. The economy may still get away with
the stimulatory fiscal measures being adopted in successive budgets, but the possible
dangers are certainly enhanced by the current stance of policy.
The wage increases provided under the draft Programme for Prosperity and Fairness
(PPF) agreement seem reasonable and within the range that the economy can be expected
to carry. In the absence of an agreement, market forces might well deliver similar
increases, though the process of local bargaining could be more painful and wasteful of
resources.
What could destabilise this process is the continuing very rapid increase in the demand
for labour, encouraging an overshooting in wage rates beyond their long-term sustainable
level. With demand picking up in the wider EU economy the stimulatory nature of
domestic fiscal policy is increasing this danger. While tax cuts can affect labour supply,
their immediate impact on demand is much greater, leading to enhanced inflationary
pressures in the labour market.
The Role of Fiscal Policy
As argued above, the dangers that may arise from regional inflation within a monetary
union are more limited than in the case of economies outside a monetary union. In the
end the discipline of the union will regulate the rate of goods price inflation and will also
exert some discipline on the price of services. However, there remains the danger that
excess demand for labour may set off a process of wage inflation that may be difficult to
unwind or even to halt. There is a particular danger that may arise from inflation in
regional asset prices, principally the price of property.
Because property is non-tradable and because the supply response to changing prices is
slow, it is possible for bubbles to grow and burst in regional property markets within a
monetary union. We have seen cases of this happening in the mid-west of the USA in the
mid-1980s and somewhat later in Massachusetts. In both these cases the bursting of the
bubble caused significant disruption to the local economies. Where the bursting bubble is
also accompanied by a collapse of regional financial institutions the impact of the shock
can be greatly aggravated. This was the case in the 1980s collapse in the mid-west of the
US and it was also the case in the collapse in property prices in Scandinavia around 1990.
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While the loss of the instrument of monetary policy limits the scope for member
governments of a monetary union to control their economies, they still have a range of
other instruments available to them. As discussed in the introduction, in promoting
economic development they have a wide range of supply side policies to choose from.
The policies available to control regional inflation and to limit the consequences of any
bubble in regional asset prices are prudential action by the Central Bank and fiscal policy.
For the financial system, the implementation of normal prudential safeguards by the
Central Bank can ensure that the system is robust in the face of all likely shocks. In the
case of Ireland, the major financial institutions are quite diversified in terms of their
geographical interests (outside Ireland) and also in terms of their asset portfolio within
Ireland. Irish property does not form a major part of their assets. For smaller institutions,
more dependent on the Irish market the use of financial instruments, in particular
mortgage securitisation, can reduce their domestic market exposure to the property
sector.
In the case of the mid-west of the US in the 1980s, the effects of restrictive banking laws
made the local financial system very vulnerable to local shocks. In the wake of the
problems of the 1980s, there has been some liberalisation of US banking laws and the
Federal Reserve Board of Kansas has actively promoted the use of securitisation to
further reduce the local financial system's vulnerability. However, in the EU the financial
system is generally much more diversified and less vulnerable to regional shocks.
Finally, all the evidence points to a much lower exposure of the household sector in
Ireland to financial shocks. In spite of the rapid expansion in finance for investment in
housing in recent years, the level of indebtedness of the household sector remains low by
international standards and the average size of mortgage, relative to the valuation of the
related property, is also low.
While prudential behaviour by financial institutions and individual households can
minimise the consequences of any shock to the system, it is not a suitable substitute for
monetary policy in controlling domestic inflationary pressures. In a fully integrated
financial market, any attempt to regulate the lending behaviour of domestic financial
institutions would not be permitted under EMU and it would in any event be totally
ineffective. Credit controls on domestic institutions would immediately be outflanked by
competition from foreign institutions.
The key instrument still available to governments within EMU to control regional
inflationary pressures is fiscal policy. Depending on the factors driving regional inflation,
fiscal policy can be a quite effective instrument of policy. In Ireland today the pressures
are particularly acute on the labour market where excess demand for labour is driving up
wage rates. This, in turn, is giving rise to quite rapid inflation in the price of privately
provided domestic services (Meyler, 1999). Where, the inflationary pressures are coming
from outside the economy domestic fiscal policy will obviously be less effective.
21
Figure 8: Measure of Budgetary Stance
Figure 9: Effect of Fiscal Policy Indexation from 1974-99
A wide range of studies over the last 20 years have all indicated that domestic fiscal
policy can have a significant impact on domestic demand for labour. (Fitz Gerald and
Keegan, 1982, Bradley et al., 1993, Barry and Bradley, 1991, Bradley and Whelan,
1995). As shown in Figure 8 (Duffy, Fitz Gerald, Kearney and Smyth, 1999), over the
course of the 1980s fiscal policy was strongly deflationary. The cumulative impact of the
tight fiscal policy over the decade was to take 8 percentage points of GNP out of the
economy. The result of this necessary deflation was a major fall in employment.
The impact of the tightening of fiscal policy in the 1980s is shown in Figure 9. This
shows the path GNP would have taken if a neutral fiscal policy had been pursued over the
25 years from 1974 to 1999. Such a fiscal stance would have been tighter than the actual
policy of the 1970s, especially of the 1978-80 period. However, it would have been much
laxer than that of the 1980s. By 1990 the effect of the tight fiscal policy of the 1980s was
to reduce the level of GNP by 10 percentage points. Obviously any other course of action
in fiscal policy would have been unsustainable, this downward adjustment was essential
given the fiscal crisis. But this simulation illustrates the point that fiscal policy is an
effective instrument for modulating the level of domestic demand in a regional economy.
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Today a tightening of fiscal policy would clearly have an impact on the labour market.
Given the limitations on labour supply, a tighter fiscal policy would serve to reduce
labour demand resulting, in turn, in a moderation in pressures for higher wage rates.7
Membership of EMU has not changed the situation.
One possible argument suggesting that fiscal policy may be less effective today than in
the past is that, given the strength of the public finances, any tightening of fiscal policy
will inevitably involve a future relaxation. As a result, households may discount such a
tightening and borrow against the inevitability of future tax cuts (or expenditure
increases).8 However, while such forward looking behaviour could somewhat reduce the
effectiveness of fiscal policy, this reduction in efficacy is likely to be limited. Many
households may be credit constrained, many are risk averse, and the assumption of
forward looking behaviour and perfect foresight is clearly extreme.
The area of economic activity where the loss of the monetary policy instrument is
particularly felt is in regulating the domestic property market. Because it impacts in
particular on the costs of capital, all forms of investment are sensitive to it. Fiscal policy
when used for stabilisation purposes, is a much blunter instrument. The Murphy model,
Bacon, McCabe, and Murphy,1998, of the housing market indicates that the demand for
housing is quite elastic with respect to real income. These results fit in with the results in
the HERMES model of the Irish economy. However, even with quite a high income
elasticity (close to 2) a very big change is needed in real incomes to make a major impact
on housing demand. In making such a large change, the fall-out in terms of the rest of the
economy would be quite high.
By contrast, it is possible for monetary authorities to make sufficiently large changes  in
interest rates to manage effectively the short-term demand for housing.9 Because it is
better targeted at investment spending it is likely to produce lower "collateral damage".
While fiscal policy applied in a general way may be a relatively blunt instrument for
managing demand for property, it is possible to target it more effectively. In particular,
the abolition of mortgage interest relief and of all tax support (and other subsidies) for the
building industry would produce a more direct impact on housing prices. Irvine, 1984,
showed that the abolition of property taxes (household rates) added significantly to house
prices in the late 1970s. Similarly the abolition of Residential Property Tax in the 1997
budget contributed significantly to the current housing price boom. A reintroduction of
property taxes today would have a very direct impact on house prices.
Even under EMU there are a range of policy options available to governments to manage
regional inflationary pressures. Even where these pressures are localised in the property
market, the authorities still have significant powers to influence events through the use of
                                                
7 It will also reduce labour supply but this effect will be quite small relative to the demand effect.
8 This argument (Riccardian equivalence) has been considered by Whelan, 1991.
9 Because there is in theory no limit to high interest rates can be raised they can be used to “scare” potential
buyers of property.
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targeted fiscal policy measures. The problem that Ireland faces today is that successive
governments have shown themselves averse to using these instruments. In this they are
clearly reflecting public opinion. However, this is a political problem, not a necessary
consequence of membership of monetary union.
While it was widely recognised that the regime shift that monetary union involved had
serious consequences for all branches of the private sector there has been a failure by the
government sector itself to recognise the changed environment. While advocating
policies to promote flexibility in private sector behaviour, successive governments have
not fully recognised the implications of the regime shift for the use of the traditional
levers of fiscal policy.
Conclusions
Membership of EMU was expected to bring long-term benefits for the Irish economy
through reducing the cost of capital. To date the evidence suggests that this will in fact
happen. However, EMU also involves the loss of the monetary policy instrument for use
for regulating the economies of individual member states. In the short-term interest rates
are too low given the significant local inflationary pressures within the Irish economy. In
this paper we have considered some of the things that might go wrong with the Irish
economy. This highlights the extent to which the Irish economy’s exposure to US
economic success (and possible failure) has increased in recent years and the extent to
which its exposure to the vagaries of sterling has fallen.
However, while monetary policy is no longer available, other policy instruments are
available to manage the regional economy:
Fiscal policy remains a key instrument for all regional governments. Much of the focus of
attention over the last few years has centred on the Maastricht guidelines and how they
might restrict fiscal policy independence. This has distracted attention from the enhanced
importance of fiscal policy for managing the cycle in individual regional economies.
While successive Irish governments have highlighted the importance of the regime
change for the private sector they have failed to take on board the full implications of the
new regime for the role of fiscal policy.
Fiscal policy is a suitable instrument for modulating regional demand for labour. It has
been shown to be effective in this role in the past. While less effective in targeting
inflationary tendencies in the property market, it can still play an effective role. The
major obstacle to using fiscal policy successfully in such a role to replace monetary
policy is the difficulty obtaining political acceptance of the necessary unpalatable short-
term measures.
Experience elsewhere has shown that an important precondition for economic success is
the maintenance of a sound domestic financial system. The importance of the prudential
role of the monetary authorities in regulating the regional financial system needs to be
highlighted. However, even a cursory examination of the Irish financial system suggests
that it is indeed structured in such a manner that it could ride out any likely regional
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shock. The failings of regional financial systems that contributed to regional crises in the
past in the US and Scandinavia do not apply to the Irish system of today.
Much of the argument we see today about the problems in managing the Irish economy
relates to a world that never was, never could have been, and never will be. The
experience of monetary independence from 1979 to 1998 showed just how limited that
independence really was (Honohan and Conroy, 1994). While an independent monetary
policy would in theory allow the Irish authorities today to control inflationary pressures
in property markets, the reality is that the decision would have been taken out of their
hands long ago and market forces would almost certainly have terminated the current
boom prematurely. For a small economy such as Ireland the counterfactual to the present
regime is not monetary independence but rather a highly constrained environment where
uncertainty and information costs would impose a substantial permanent cost to the
economy. For an economy the size of the UK monetary independence is more of a
reality, though even for the UK its is also highly constrained.
While membership of the EMU reduces the range of instruments available to the Irish
authorities to manage the domestic economy, increasing the risk that things might go
wrong, EMU membership also reduces the potential economic cost of such an
eventuality. Because interest rates and exchange rates are set independently of
circumstances in the Irish economy, any purely domestic shock to the Irish economy will
have no impact on them. If Ireland were outside the EMU then market forces, even
without domestic policy action, would probably have halted the current boom
prematurely. If it had not, in the event of a shock to the system, then the consequences
would probably have been a very substantial increase in domestic interest rates and a
sudden fall in the exchange rate that could be expected to have further aggravated the
consequences of such a shock.
It is an illusion to believe that small economies can pursue totally independent monetary
policies in a global world. Certainly that was the experience of Ireland over its 20 years
of nominal independence. Within EMU the parameters of domestic policy action are
reduced, but not eliminated. However, this changed environment requires changes in the
way governments manage their economies with more attention being placed on the
regional impact of fiscal policy. Member governments have frequently stressed the need
for the private sector to adjust to the regime change that EMU membership involves.
There is also a need for the governments themselves to recognise this change in
formulating their own policies.
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